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RESEARCH AND ITS REVELATION:
WHEN SHOULD COURTS COMPEL
DISCLOSURE?
BERT BLACK*
I
INTRODUCTION
As a longtime commentator on the uneasy relationship between law and
science, I was asked to review six of the symposium papers in this issue of Law
and Contemporary Problems that address judicially compelled disclosure of an
unretained expert’s research results and opinions.1  The debate embodied in
these papers is both lively and well-informed.  After completing my review,
however, I found myself largely in agreement with all the authors, yet still
without a very clear answer to the question posed in the title—when should
courts compel disclosure?
The papers’ clear explanation of why the law favors disclosure and why re-
searchers sometimes find it burdensome and oppressive should help bridge the
gap between the culture of law and the culture of researchespecially scientific
research.  What is missing, however, is a synthesis that would provide a broader
policy context and a framework for distinguishing between different kinds of
cases and fact patterns.  Thus, my objective in this review is to outline a concep-
tual matrix for the papers rather than to criticize them.  I also suggest amend-
ments to Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that would ease the
friction between the law and experts who want to avoid other peoples’ litiga-
tion.
II
WHY IS DISCLOSURE AN ISSUE?
To assure rational and informed verdicts in civil litigation, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure give litigants broad power to seek and obtain informa-
tion.  As Judge Crabb explains in her article,  “judges operate within a system
that places a high priority upon obtaining relevant evidence that will aid in the
truth-finding process.”2  Professor Carrington and Ms. Jones also emphasize
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this high priority.  They suggest that “[a]s a mark of the importance attached to
the entitlement of adversaries to possible relevant evidence, Rule 45 authorizes
any lawyer in any action in any federal court … [to invoke the power of the
court system] to coerce … desired disclosure.”3
Professor O’Neil, however, cautions that the effects of compelled disclosure
on scholarship can be “devastating.”4  He identifies four problems created for
researchers by subpoenas: (1) disruption of the reporting and disclosure process
within which scholarly investigations are usually conducted; (2) interference
with the research process itself; (3) misinterpretation or misunderstanding of
research results; and (4) concerns about compromising promises of confidenti-
ality made to people who agree to be research subjects.
These statements of the countervailing arguments on compelled disclosure
are clear enough, but they miss what ought to be at the heart of the debate.
The question should not be whether the institutional interests of the judicial
system are more important than the institutional interests of scientists and
other researchers, but rather how to optimize society’s development and use of
knowledge.  Though not addressed explicitly in the symposium papers, it also
should be noted that the answer to this question does not depend on whether
one has a “plaintiffs’ perspective” or a “defendants’ perspective.”  Both plain-
tiff and defense lawyers have sought discovery from experts who are otherwise
uninvolved in litigation, and both have opposed it.
The fundamental problem of optimizing the development and use of
knowledge is best understood in terms of competing needs for information.
From this broader social perspective, if subpoenaed information improves the
resolution of a dispute at no cost other than annoying an unretained expert, it
should be disclosed.  On the other hand, if disclosure is so damaging to research
that society is deprived of important knowledge, a court should seriously con-
sider limiting a litigant’s rights to discovery.  Real cases, of course, typically fall
somewhere between these simple and obvious extremes.
Although courts do not always explicitly address the competing needs for
information, this policy issue clearly motivates many of the decisions regarding
disclosure disputes.  Perhaps the best example of such motivation is the case of
Dr. Arthur Herbst, whose ongoing research on the drug diethylstilbestrol
(“DES”) and its relationship to certain forms of cancer became the target of
discovery. 5  In the process of his research, Dr. Herbst compiled a registry that
monitored “the clinical, pathological, and epidemiological aspects of clear cell
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5. For a more detailed discussion of this case, see Crabb, supra note 2, at 10-16; Elizabeth C.
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tion, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 72-73 (Summer 1996).
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adenocarcinoma of the genital tract and was the only centralized repository of
data on that disease.” 6
The relevance of the registry to the litigation was clear and undisputed, and
so was the adverse effect disclosure would have on Dr. Herbst’s research.  The
resulting loss of confidentiality would make it difficult, if not impossible, for
him to continue collecting information.  The district court quashed the defen-
dant’s subpoena, noting that if disclosure were compelled, the registry would be
compromised, and “all society [would] be the poorer … [and] a unique and vi-
tal resource for learning about the incidence, causes and treatment of adeno-
carcinoma [would] be lost.”7  On appeal, however, the Seventh Circuit recog-
nized the need to strike a balance between the competing informational needs
of society and the litigants, and ordered the lower court to fashion appropriate
limitations on the scope of disclosure.8 Ultimately, “[a]fter procedural wran-
gling and much negotiation, the parties reached agreement on a method of
producing the requested data stripped of its identifiers.”9
III
CONFIDENTIALITY
As the Herbst case illustrates, perhaps the strongest argument for protect-
ing unretained experts from discovery is concern about the confidentiality of
information provided by research subjects.  Analytically, however, this issue is
just one part of the broader concern that compelling disclosure may result in
limiting the knowledge that research produces for society.  If a researcher
forthrightly qualifies assurances of confidentiality with a proviso that data will
not be disclosed except as required by law, some potential research subjects may
hesitate to participate.10  For example, such a caveat surely would limit AIDS
research.
Compelled disclosure is most likely to occur when researchers explore areas
like AIDS, and potential subjects for such research are the people who most
likely will fear the consequences of disclosure.  Thus, it is precisely where up-
front limitations on confidentiality are most necessary that they do the most
harm.  As a practical matter, an investigator may face a nasty Hobson’s choice:
(1) either be frank about the potential for disclosure, which will drive off poten-
tial subjects; (2) break an unqualified promise; or (3) refuse to disclose and go
to jail for contempt.  The choice often will be quite urgent.  In most cases, dis-
covery orders are not immediately appealable, even when they are directed to a
nonparty.11
                                                          
6. Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556, 558 (7th Cir. 1984).
7. Id. at 560.
8. See Id. at 563-65.
9. Wiggins & McKenna, supra note 5, at 81 n.39.
10. See Michael Traynor, Countering the Excessive Subpoena for Scholarly Research, 59 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 122 (Summer 1996).
11. Id.;  see also Crabb, supra note 2, at 32.
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Because society benefits from research, investigators should be protected as
much as possible from this scenario.  An absolute scholar’s privilege, however,
would go too far.12  Though federal statutory law does protect some research in-
formation,13 “neither legislatures nor courts have granted researchers an abso-
lute privilege to protect the confidentiality of research data,”14 and it is unlikely
they will do so in the future.15  In the end, society must rely primarily on the
sound discretion of judges, but the guidance provided in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure on how to exercise this discretion could be improved.  For ex-
ample, Rule 45 presently allows a court to quash or limit a subpoena if it
“requires disclosure of a trade secret or other confidential research, develop-
ment, or commercial information.”16  This focus on only adverse economic and
commercial impacts may lead courts to ignore some of the other very serious
effects compelled disclosure can have on research.  Amending the rules to ad-
dress these concerns would institutionalize the better reasoned judicial deci-
sions in this area and would help ameliorate some of the hostility scientists hold
for the law.17
IV
OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING DECISIONS ABOUT COMPELLING DISCLOSURE
There are important analytical distinctions between the different kinds of
information experts provide and between the different ways in which informa-
tion from unretained experts is used.  The special knowledge experts bring to
court consists of both facts and the ability to reach conclusions based on those
facts and on other evidence in a case.  For example, if an environmental scien-
tist was asked to investigate the effects of an oil spill, he or she would probably
already know or have access to facts such as the density and solubility of differ-
ent kinds of oil.  This kind of information, coupled with case-specific details,
would provide the factual predicate for the expert’s conclusions, which would
be reached through the reasoning and methodology of his or her field.
Experts thus provide facts, opinions, or a mix of the two, and the informa-
tion sought from an unretained expert can fall into any of these three catego-
ries.  Motions to quash subpoenas of unretained experts are usually raised
when an expert testifying for one party relies on someone else’s research re-
sults, and the opposing party wants to examine the underlying data or assump-
tions.  Again, Dr. Herbst’s case provides a prime example.  The plaintiffs’ ex-
perts relied heavily on his work and his published articles, and the defendant
was “threatened with … having [him] as a potent [adverse] expert witness …
                                                          
12. See infra Part VII for further discussion of the scholar’s privilege.
13. See infra Part VIII for a discussion of statutory protection.
14. Traynor, supra note 10, at 119.
15. See Crabb, supra note 2, at 24.
16. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(B)(i).
17. See infra Part IX for a discussion of how to improve the resolution of disputes about disclosure
to better address the concern that research may be adversely affected.
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without his ever taking the stand or being subject to cross-examination.”18  As a
result, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the defendant was entitled to review Dr.
Herbst’s underlying data in order to explore its relationship to his opinions.
Although the distinction between data and opinions was not an issue in the
Herbst case, the difference can be important.19  It is one thing to force disclo-
sure of data, but quite another matter to force an unretained expert to formu-
late opinions that might be relevant.  In the case of Karp v. Cooley,20 for exam-
ple, the plaintiff sought to compel Dr. Michael DeBakey, a heart surgeon, to
opine about the handling of a particular case by other doctors.  The court, how-
ever, refused to order Dr. DeBakey to testify after finding that he knew noth-
ing about the medical details of the case and did not want to delve into them.21
Forcing the revelation of preliminary, unreviewed reports raises similar is-
sues.  In United States v. Allen,22 for example, the judge rejected an attempt by
Dow Chemical to subpoena information related to studies on the effects of low
level exposure to a chemical known as dioxin.23  In its decision, the court took
notice that “[i]n the early stages of any research project there are likely to be
false leads or problems which will be resolved in the course of the study.”24  It
also found that “[t]o force production of all [the subpoenaed information
would] likely … jeopardize the study by exposing it to … criticism … before
there has been an opportunity for the researchers … to make sure the study is
the result of their best efforts.”25  The court’s decision thus recognized the
minimal probative value of work in progress as well as the substantial burden of
compliance on the unretained experts.
The Allen case apparently involved both data and preliminary reports based
on the data, leaving open the question of how a court would react to a sub-
poena that sought only raw data.  If a party wanted to have a retained expert
review and interpret data from someone else’s research, the legal analysis
might be different.  Suppose, for example, that the chemical composition of a
                                                          
18. Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556, 561 (7th Cir. 1984).
19. See, e.g., Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811, 822 (2d Cir. 1976) (noting that the exercise of
district court’s discretion should be informed, among other factors,  by “the degree to which the expert
is being called because of his knowledge of facts relevant to the case rather than in order to give opin-
ion testimony “).
20. 349 F. Supp. 827 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff’d, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.), 419 U.S. 845 (1974).  For fur-
ther discussion of this case, see Crabb, supra note 2, at 29-30.
21. The court found that Dr. DeBakey “had not been employed to give any expert medical opin-
ion; that he would not accept any employment in this case; that he had never examined Mr. Karp; that
he had never seen Mr. Karp; that he would refuse to express any medical opinion concerning the
treatment of Mr. Karp; that he would not express any medical opinion based upon hypothetical ques-
tions even if asked to do so; and in connection with the Cooley-Liotta mechanical heart used in Mr.
Karp, he would refuse to express an in-court expert opinion concerning that device.”  Karp, 349 F.
Supp. at 836.
22. 494 F. Supp. 107 (W.D. Wis. 1980), aff’d sub nom. Dow Chemical Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262
(7th Cir. 1984).  For further discussion of this case, see Crabb, supra note 2, at 21-22; O’Neil, supra
note 4, at 39-40; Wiggins & McKenna, supra note 5, at 70-71.
23. Dioxins are actually a family of chemicals.  The “family member” at issue in the case was
2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin.  Allen, 494 F. Supp. at 108.
24. Id. at 113.
25. Id.
BLACK.FMT 08/13/97  2:47 PM
174 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 59:  No. 3
waste water discharge were at issue in a case, and that a professor (an unre-
tained expert) had conducted a study of the river into which the discharge
flowed.  Suppose further that the study included gas chromatography data
which had never been interpreted, but could be downloaded to a computer
disk.  If experts reasonably rely upon such information to determine the com-
position of waste water, it would qualify under Fed. R. Evid. 703 as the basis for
an opinion by a retained expert, and the Allen concerns about probativeness
would not apply.  The issue would be the burden on the unretained expert, and
a court’s decision would again come down to the fundamental problem of bal-
ancing short term information needs in the context of litigation against society’s
long term information needs.
In conducting this kind of analysis, both the Allen court (Judge Crabb was
the district court judge) and the court in the Herbst case were clearly sensitive
to the effect disclosure can have on research26 and to the need for the kind of
balancing discussed in some of the symposium papers.27  As discussed at the end
of Part II, however, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not unequivocally
embrace this kind of analysis; Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3) and the advisory notes
focus only on  economic impact.  “Clause (c)(3)(B)(ii) provides appropriate
protection for the intellectual property of the non-party witness … .
[C]ompulsion to give evidence may threaten the intellectual property of experts
denied the opportunity bargain for the value of their services.”28  Again,
amending the federal rule to recognize the broader social concerns more ex-
plicitly would be a significant improvement.
V
SUBPOENA ABUSE AND THE PEER REVIEW PROCESS
The use of experts in litigation has increased dramatically over the last
twenty years, and one unfortunate result has been the manipulation of research
by litigants.  In some cases, lawyers have sponsored studies by private research
organizations that publish the results only if they are helpful to the sponsoring
lawyer’s client.29  Although this practice can introduce an unhealthy bias into a
                                                          
26. Of course, litigation does not always impede research.  In some cases it may actually spur re-
search efforts.  As Judge Crabb points out in her paper, “[a]lthough some individual researchers may
be deterred from entering a particular field because of its controversial and public nature, others may
be attracted to it for the same reason.”  Crabb, supra note2, at 18.
27. See id. at 26-27 (listing seven factors for a court to consider, and suggesting that “[I]f a party
seeking discovery shows that the discovery consists of unique information of significant probative
value at the heart of the case, this showing will outweigh almost any claim of burdensomeness or
breach of confidentiality”; Traynor, supra note 10, at 136-46 (detailed discussion of constitutional is-
sues and policy questions, and of how to preserve significant matters for appellate review); Wiggins &
McKenna, supra note 5, at 75-88 (listing concerns raised by subpoenas to researchers, and discussing
balancing the interests of litigants and researchers; the concerns include economic and temporal bur-
dens, confidentiality of data and privacy of research participants, and disclosing incomplete and un-
published research findings).
28. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(B)(ii) advisory committee’s note (1991).
29. See Philip E. Enterline, Toxic Torts: Are they Poisoning the Scientific Literature?, 30 AM. J.
INDUS. MED. 121 (1996).
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field’s literature, so long as authors reveal their sources of support, the problem
is not severe.  If there is such disclosure, and if a paper goes through the regular
peer review process, its validity should be judged as other scientific work is
judged.
Other kinds of legal entanglement with research present far more serious
problems.  For example, litigants may attempt to use discovery and subpoenas
as tools for harassing researchers whose results are unfavorable to one side, es-
pecially when a large number of cases might be affected.  Professor O’Neil’s
paper recounts one case in which the court quashed a subpoena, expressing
concern for “the potential … chilling effect on research.”30  The court noted the
value of scientific and applied research and suggested that “discovery offers an
avenue for indirect harassment of researchers whose published work points to
defects in products or practices.”31
The current litigation about the alleged impact of silicone breast implants
on women’s health has produced a particularly egregious example of harass-
ment through discovery.  The first reliable epidemiologic study in this area,
conducted by the Mayo Clinic, was not published until the middle of 1994, sev-
eral years after the first lawsuits were filed.32  It showed that women with im-
plants were “no more likely to develop connective tissue disease (or related
symptoms and abnormal blood tests) than [women] without implants.” 33  The
plaintiffs’ lawyers, displeased with these results, responded with subpoenas to
the author of the article and to other epidemiologists working in the field.  In
these subpoenas, the researchers “were asked to produce absurdly large vol-
umes of documents, many of no conceivable relevance.”34  According to one
prominent doctor, this has had “a chilling effect on implant research; no one
will want to do it, given the likely consequences.  Even more important, this use
of subpoena powers threatens the very existence of several large epidemiologic
databases … .”35
Worse still were the breast implant plaintiffs’ efforts to subpoena peer re-
view records from the New England Journal of Medicine, the journal in which
the Mayo Clinic study was published.36  Although the subpoenas were quashed,
the very attempt to breach the anonymity of peer review raises serious ques-
tions.  Review lies at the heart of the scientific community’s development of
new ideas through a process of testing and refinement.  One philosopher of sci-
ence has written that this process not only reflects the scientific method, but
that “it is the scientific method itself.”37
                                                          
30. O’Neil, supra note 4, at 40 (citing In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. 211, 215 (D. Ariz. 1987)).
31. In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. 211, 216 (D. Ariz. 1987).
32. See S.E. Gabriel et al., Risk of Connective-Tissue Diseases and Other Disorders After Breast
Implantation, 330 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 1697 (1994).
33. MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL:  THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE LAW
IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE 101 (1996).
34. Id. at 145-46.
35. Id. at 146.
36. See Id. at 145.
37. John Ziman, What is Science?, in INTRODUCTORY READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
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Anonymity in the review process assures frank criticism, and it should not
be compromised except under the most unusual circumstances.38  From the per-
spective of legal relevance, there is simply no reason for disclosure of either re-
viewers’ names or of anonymous reviewer comments made with the under-
standing that they will not be passed along to a paper’s author.  Peer reviewers
acquire no information from the review process that is not in the manuscripts
they consider.  If a manuscript is flawed, a litigant’s retained expert should be
capable of identifying its problems just as well as those who reviewed the
manuscript for purposes of publication.
Moreover, the importance of protecting the peer review process is explicitly
recognized by the law in other contexts.  “Concern that the candor necessary to
the effective functioning of [hospital peer review committees] would be de-
stroyed if their proceedings were discoverable has led to the adoption of stat-
utes in a number of states conferring a privilege from discovery upon [them],”39
and all fifty states provide at least some protection for the individuals who par-
ticipate in medical peer review.40  In some ways the argument for protecting the
peer review of research is even stronger.  Medical peer review is usually an is-
sue when the hospital conducting it is a party in litigation and if it merits pro-
tection, so too should research peer review conducted by nonparties.  Society
relies on this process to help assure the quality of research in science and other
fields.
VI
THE PLACE OF PEER REVIEW IN LITIGATION AND THE IMPACT OF DAUBERT
Litigants seek information about peer review because they see it as excel-
lent ammunition for cross-examination.  The district court in the case of Dr.
Herbst’s work, however, suggested that studies should be immune from discov-
ery precisely because they have withstood the review process.41  As Judge
Crabb discusses in her paper, the court considering the subpoena of this work
found that the defendant’s “need for the data was speculative because Herbst’s
study had been subjected to the scrutiny of the medical profession for more
than a decade and ‘nothing in the record indicate[d] [anything] other than that
[Herbst’s] conclusions ha[d] been fully corroborated.’”42  The Seventh Circuit,
                                                          
SCIENCE 35, 40 (E.D. Klemke et al. eds., 1980).
38. One example would be a case in which the issue under litigation was misconduct in the context
of peer review.  See, e.g., Eliot Marshall, Trial Set on Peer Review, 273 SCI. 1162 (1996).
39. Donna M. Bloemer, Kentucky’s Approach to the Discoverability of Peer Review, 23 N. KY L.
REV. 275, 276 (1996).
40. Looking beyond the benefits of active internal review in medicine, some commentators have
suggested a more general self-analysis or audit privilege.  See generally Joseph E. Murphy & Ilise L.
Feitshans, Protecting the Compliance Audit PLI CORP. LAW & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK (1996);
Michael J. Holland, The Self-Analysis Privilege: Obscuring the Truth but Safeguarding Improvement?,
25 THE BRIEF 52 (Fall 1995).
41. See Andrews v. Eli Lilly & Co., 97 F.R.D. 494, 498 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
42. Crabb, supra note 2, at 13 (quoting Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556, 562-
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however, “gave short shrift” to this suggestion, “point[ing] out that no one had
publicly reviewed the actual core data behind Herbst’s studies or identified the
basis and evidence upon which he classified a patient’s ‘exposure’ or
‘nonexposure’ to DES.”43
Judge Crabb quite correctly criticizes this effort to substitute peer review
for the usual litigation tools of discovery and cross-examination.  She goes too
far, however, when she distinguishes between legal and scientific methods for
testing the validity of research results and implies that they may be incompati-
ble.  In particular, she misconstrues the Supreme Court’s unambiguous admoni-
tion in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 44 that “[t]he subject of [a
scientific] expert’s testimony must be ‘scientific … knowledge.’”45  Research not
recognized as scientifically valid outside the courtroom cannot suddenly be-
come valid under nonscientific criteria just because it is proffered as evidence.
Thus, her argument that Daubert “[does] not suggest that … [scientifically ac-
cepted] methods would be the sole means of challenging a theory or a study”46
seems off target.
This statement apparently confuses tools of inquiry with criteria of validity.
If it means only that litigants should be free to use cross-examination and other
legal modes of inquiry to explore scientific validity, there is no real dichotomy
between law and science, and I agree with the assertion.  I also would agree
that a litigant should be free to explore questions of bias—and even veracity—
that peer reviewers normally might not consider.  If the statement means there
are special legal criteria for deciding what constitutes scientific knowledge,
however, I do not agree, and neither does Daubert. 47
The Supreme Court’s non-exclusive list of factors to be considered in as-
sessing “whether the reasoning or methodology underlying [an expert’s] testi-
mony is scientifically valid”48 was aimed at helping trial courts determine if evi-
dence meets the criteria scientists themselves consider. The Court’s frank
acknowledgement that courts (and scientists) also might apply other factors re-
flects the fact that science cannot be simply defined,49 but it does not mean that
non-scientific modes of analysis should be used to test scientific validity in the
context of litigation.
Though I question some of Judge Crabb’s discussion of Daubert, I agree
with her ultimate assessment of its likely impact on discovery.  She concludes
                                                          
63 (7th Cir. 1984); citing Andrews v. Eli Lilly & Co., 97 F.R.D. 494, 498 (N.D. Ill. 1983)).
43. Id.
44. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
45. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-90.
46. See Crabb, supra note2, at 14.
47. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-90, 592-93.
48. See id. at 592-93.
49. Bert Black et al., Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New Search for Scientific
Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 715, 756-757 (1994) (“noting that seeking a perfect definition [of science]
is futile.  Science is a complex enterprise that cannot be captured adequately in a compact state-
ment.”).
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that its emphasis on scientific validity and its “explicit delegation of gatekeep-
ing responsibility to the trial judge [will] likely … spur litigants to seek discov-
ery that will not only help persuade a jury of the inadequacy of a particular
study result but will convince the trial court that the result does not meet
Daubert’s standards for admissibility.”50  If the case prompts this response, the
end result should be better informed verdicts and better informed decisions
about the admissibility of disputed expert testimony.
VII
THE SCHOLAR’S PRIVILEGE—A CONFUSING SIDESHOW
Some of the cases discussed in the symposium papers address the plight of
researchers who attempted to avoid subpoenas by asserting a broad “scholar’s
privilege,” a legal theory that has not been favorably received by the courts.
For the analysis of forced disclosure by unretained experts, these cases are
mostly a confusing sideshow.  Two of the leading decisions involved criminal
rather than civil matters, and the information sought had nothing to do with
expertise and very little to do with scholarship.  They are relevant to the unre-
tained expert issue only because the scholar’s privilege could be an argument
for quashing a subpoena if the privilege were recognized and if the unretained
expert’s information was directly related to scholarship. These are big ifs.
In both of the criminal cases, sociology graduate students sought to avoid
providing information to a grand jury.51  In one case, from the Second Circuit,
the student was working in a restaurant to gather information for his disserta-
tion on the sociology of the American restaurant.52  A suspicious fire and explo-
sion occurred at the restaurant, and as part of the investigation, the journal he
kept was subpoenaed.  The district court quashed the subpoena, holding that by
analogy the qualified privilege accorded journalists “applies to any scholar col-
lecting data with a view to publication,”53 but the ruling was reversed on ap-
peal.54  The appellate court found the record “too sparse to serve as a vehicle
for consideration of whether a scholar’s privilege exists, much less to provide
grounds for applying it[.]”55  The court also admonished that whatever the re-
sult of further proceedings on the issue, “[a]ctual observation of criminal activ-
ity is not subject to a claim of privilege.”56
The other case, from the Ninth Circuit, involved an investigation into who
                                                          
50. Crabb, supra note 2, at 14.
51. Both cases are discussed in O’Neil, supra note 4, at 41-42.  The Second Circuit Case is also dis-
cussed in Crabb, supra note 2, at 22-23, and in Wiggins & McKenna, supra note 5, at 73.
52. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated January 4, 1984, 750 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1984).
53. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated January 4, 1984, 583 F.Supp. 991, 992 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
54. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 750 F.2d at 224.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 226.  Ultimately, “the federal prosecutor accepted production of the journal edited by
[the student] to remove privileged material as full compliance with the subpoena.”  Wiggins &
McKenna, supra note 5, at 83.
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had vandalized a Washington State University animal research facility.57  The
graduate student was not a suspect, but his houseguest was.  The student re-
fused to give information about the guest because the guest was participating as
a subject in the student’s sociology research.  The Ninth Circuit was even
harsher than the Second Circuit in its rejection of the scholar’s privilege, noting
that to its knowledge, no court “has actually recognized a scholar’s privilege to
withhold from a federal grand jury confidentially obtained information which is
relevant to a legitimate grand jury inquiry … .  Accordingly, [the court] de-
cline[d] to acknowledge such a privilege as a matter of federal common law.”58
The reluctance of both circuits to embrace the scholar’s privilege argument
is understandable.  First, the relationship between the information sought and
the academic research was tenuous.  The journal in the restaurant fire case was
clearly “scholarly work product,” but claiming that entries relating to a possible
arson were the kind of information expected in sociological research seems du-
bious at best.  The relationship between the information at issue in the vandal-
ism case and the student’s academic work was even more remote.  Second, nei-
ther case involved expertise.  For purposes of the litigation, the students were
not experts; had either been willing to testify, he would have been a lay witness.
Judicial skepticism of the scholar’s privilege is also apparent in civil cases.
Judge Crabb’s paper discusses several examples and concludes that they “give
little evidence that a researcher’s privilege is emerging or that if one did, it
would offer researchers any more protection than they have now.”59  She also
concludes that “amended [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 45(c)(3)(B) provides researchers
with as much protection as a conditional [researcher’s] privilege would.”60
VIII
STATUTORY PROTECTION
Although courts have not recognized any absolute privileges against the
disclosure of research information, several federal statutes do afford some pro-
tection, at least under certain circumstances.61  One statutory provision
“protects information obtained through activities carried out or supported by
the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research… .  [It] provides a self-
executing grant of confidentiality … to all projects that fall within its scope.”62
Another provision “gives the Secretary of Health discretion to grant federal
confidentiality certificates … [that give a researcher] discretion to refuse to di-
vulge the identity of the individual source who furnished … data.”63  A similar
statute gives the attorney general discretion to authorize drug abuse research-
                                                          
57. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F.3d 397 (9th Cir. 1993).
58. Id. at 403.
59. Crabb, supra note 2, at 24.
60. Id. at 24-25
61. For a detailed discussion of these statutes, see generally Traynor, supra note 10.
62. Id. at 123.
63. Id.
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ers to withhold the names or other identifying characteristics of research sub-
jects.64
Only the statute governing the Agency for Health Care Policy and Re-
search provides absolute protection.  Indeed, it forbids researchers from dis-
closing information unless they have the consent of the establishment or person
who supplied the information to them.  The other protective statutes simply
allow a researcher to withhold the identity of research subjects, and they apply
only if proper certificates are obtained.
Some of the cases discussed above might have been avoided if the research-
ers involved had obtained confidentiality certificates, but this protection would
not address concerns about the time and expense of redacting files or the
problem of premature disclosure of results.  The identity of the people in Dr.
Herbst’s database might well have been protected, for example, but the end re-
sult would have been about the same.  He would have had to produce most of
his data.  Moreover, the statutes do not protect the peer review process.
From the perspective of researchers, broader statutory protection might
seem an easy answer to the problems of compelled disclosure; this approach,
however, would tip the balance too far in favor of nondisclosure.  Justice re-
quires that every reasonable effort be made to get the facts right at a trial, even
if the process sometimes interferes with the lives and work of nonlitigants.
Witnesses to traffic accidents or murders must testify if subpoenaed.  The same
principle should apply to anyone with relevant information.
Nevertheless, it would still be appropriate to provide more protection for
the peer review process.  This reform does not necessarily require a statute,
however.  As discussed in the following section, such protection can be accom-
plished by amending Fed. R. Civ. P. 45.
IX
IMPROVING THE PROCESS FOR RESOLVING DISPUTES ABOUT COMPELLED
DISCLOSURE
As Professor Jasanoff points out in her paper, the compelled disclosure of
research by unretained experts is but one part of a larger debate about the rela-
tionship between law and science. 65  Much of this debate has resulted from pro-
found misunderstanding and even mistrust between the two cultures.66  Genuine
                                                          
64. 21 U.S.C. § 872(c) (1996).
65. See generally Sheila Jasanoff, Research Subpoenas and the Sociology of Knowledge, 59 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 95 (Summer 1996).
66. As Judge Crabb puts it, “[c]onflict between [law and science] is inherent in the divergent ways
in which they operate.  This conflict is exacerbated by the fact that scientists are almost as ignorant of
the needs and workings of the legal system as lawyers and judges are of scientific activity.”  Crabb, su-
pra note 2, at 10; see also STEVEN GODLBERG, CULTURE CLASH:  LAW AND SCIENCE IN AMERICA
(1994); PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE:  JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991);
SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR:  LAW, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA (1995);
Black, supra note 49; Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113; Joseph Sanders,
From Science To Evidence:  The Testimony on Causation in the Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1
(1993); Peter H. Schuck, Multi-Culturism Redux:  Science, Law, and Politics, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y
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improvement of the relationship can come only if scientists (and others who
conduct research) and members of the legal profession make a concerted effort
to learn more about how the “other side” thinks and works.  From this perspec-
tive, the symposium papers must be judged a resounding success.
The papers by Judge Crabb,67 Michael Traynor,68 and Elizabeth Wiggins and
Judith McKenna69 suggest how research workers can maximize the protection
the legal system affords them.  These papers counsel that researchers must un-
derstand that a subpoena usually should be viewed as an “opening bid” and
that haggling and negotiation are expected.70  Judge Crabb further advises that
because of the nature of litigation, “researchers must educate the judge about
[their research and how discovery would disrupt it] if they want [these factors]
taken into consideration.”71
Professor O’Neil’s paper, on the other hand, communicates the researcher’s
concerns about subpoenas.72  His explanation of how “compelled disclosure—
especially premature disclosure—may cause [grave harm] to [the research
process’s] integrity”73 should sound a cautionary note for all courts that must
resolve such discovery disputes.  It is encouraging that after reviewing a num-
ber of cases, he concludes that much valuable experience has been gained and
that  a number of courts have provided helpful guidance.74  In the end, his views
are not too different from those of Judge Crabb and Mr. Traynor.  He con-
cludes that “[w]hat should not change is the persistent and conscientious pur-
suit by scholars and their lawyers of whatever protection the courts may afford
to the quest for knowledge.”75
Though this convergence on consensus is a significant step toward mutual
understanding, it does not reach perhaps the most important issue raised in
Professor Jasanoff’s paper: What do lawyers do with an unretained expert’s in-
formation once they obtain it?  Generally, an attorney’s objective is to open up
                                                          
REV. 1 (1993); Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1613 (1995).
67. Crabb, supra note 2, at 30-32.
68. Traynor, supra note 10, at 121-48.
69. Wiggins & McKenna, supra note 5, at 88-91.
70. Crabb, supra note 2, at 31 (arguing that unless an unretained expert can establish an alterna-
tive source for the information sought, show that the information does not have probative value, or
provide some other reason for not complying with a subpoena, “[i]t is far more likely that the judge
will direct the requester and the researcher to negotiate the terms of a modified subpoena that meets
the concerns of the researcher and the needs of the requester”); Traynor, supra note 10, at 125
(“Researchers unfamiliar with court procedures and subpoenas may be jolted when served with a sub-
poena at their workplace or residence.”); Wiggins & McKenna, supra note 5, at 89 (“Researchers are
likely to view a subpoena as a nonnegotiable command of the court.  Most attorneys, on the other
hand, view the scope of the subpoena’s document request as an opening bid.”).
71. Crabb, supra note 2, at 30.
72. See O’Neil, supra note 4, at 36.
73. Id. at 37.
74. See id. at 49.
75. Id.
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the very process of scientific reasoning to the full force of adversarial scrutiny.76
This goal immediately raises the question of whether courts are institutionally
qualified to take the next step—that is, to “evaluate both the probity and scien-
tific validity of these materials and their adequacy as a foundation for chal-
lenged evidence.”77  Professor Jasanoff suggests that courts are qualified and
that legal skepticism about science need not degenerate into mindless decon-
struction.78  After discussing various approaches courts might consider,79 she ul-
timately returns to the need “for judges to develop a keener sense of how sci-
ence works” 80 and how science’s internal constraints might therefore mesh with
or impede the requirements of the law.81
Based on their research into the final outcome of nine cases, Wiggins and
McKenna also conclude that, by and large, courts are up to the task.  They
found that “[w]ith sufficient sensitivity to the professional and scientific issues
[discussed in their paper], courts can minimize litigation-related disruption of
the development of medical and scientific knowledge without denying litigants
access to the evidence necessary to legitimate claims and defenses.”82  Thus,
there is no need for radical reform.  Nonetheless, there are five changes to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 45 that would improve the process by focusing judicial attention
more explicitly on the special concerns of scientists and of other researchers.83
First, in order to ease the harsh choice of having to be cited for contempt
before taking an appeal of a subpoena, Rule 45 should grant unretained experts
standing to appeal directly.  Second, the rule  should explicitly state that a court
must weigh the impact of a subpoena on the conduct of scientific, technical, or
other specialized research, whether or not there is an economic impact on the
specific individual subpoenaed.  Third, Rule 45 should protect the anonymity of
the peer review process.  Review comments not passed along to the author(s)
of a paper and the identity of anonymous reviewers should be discoverable only
under extreme and unusual circumstances.  Fourth, the rule should also protect
                                                          
76. Jasanoff, supra note 65, at 95-96.
77. Id. at 96.
78. Id. at 100-02.  Judge Crabb’s suggestion that something other than scientific criteria might be
used in court to assess scientific validity must give one pause on this point, however.  See Crabb, supra
note 2, at 12-14.
79. See Jasanoff, supra note 65, at 115-17.  The three approaches she suggests all merit considera-
tion: the careful screening of party experts, the appointment of independent experts, and the use of
review panels.  Professor Carrington and Ms. Jones also suggest consideration of court-appointed ex-
perts in connection with unretained experts.  Carrington & Jones, supra note 3, at 63-64.  For a more
general discussion of the use of court-appointed experts, see Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Ac-
cepting Daubert’s Invitation: Defining a Role for Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific Valid-
ity, 43 EMORY L.J. 995 (1994).
80. Jasanoff,  supra note 65, at 117.
   81. Id.
82. Wiggins & McKenna, supra note 5, at 91; see also Crabb, supra note 2, at 26-30 (suggesting a
number of ways in which courts can fashion solutions that accommodate both scientific and legal con-
cerns).
83. For a discussion of some earlier proposals for amending Rule 45 to address the problems asso-
ciated with subpoenas issued to unretained experts, see Mark Labaton, Note, Discovery and Testimony
of Unretained Experts: Creating a Clear and Equitable Standard to Govern Compliance with Subpoenas,
1987 DUKE L.J. 140.
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the identity of individual research subjects.  Finally, to encourage the kind of
negotiated solutions that already occur in many cases, Rule 45 should contain a
mechanism whereby an unretained expert is paid attorney fees if a compromise
offer is made to the party seeking disclosure and the court’s ruling requires no
disclosure beyond the offer.
X
CONCLUSION
Although the question posed in the title is still without a definitive answer, I
hope my comments have narrowed the issues and clarified the kind of analysis
a court should undertake when disputes arise about compelled disclosure by
unretained experts.  Ultimately, the best hope for improving the resolution of
such disputes is for lawyers to present the research and litigation issues clearly
and for courts to develop a “keener sense” for the area of expertise involved.
Part of the problem may be that scientists often do not know how to avoid or
contest a subpoena.  Indeed, informal discussions with several scientists indi-
cate they may not be aware of the statutory protection currently available to
them.  The problem goes deeper, however, and more protection is required.
Adopting the proposed changes to Rule 45 would address this need.  The
changes would constitute explicit recognition by the law of the special concerns
of science and would help bridge the gap between the two professional cultures.
Too often this gap hinders the law’s use of information only experts can pro-
vide.
